Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

Olivier Gossner

doi:10.3982/ECTA9385

Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

Olivier Gossner

France and IZA
School of Economics

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article › Revue par des pairs

Résumé

We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run players. The long-run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long-run player.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	1627-1641
Nombre de pages	15
journal	Econometrica
Volume	79
Numéro de publication	5
Les DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9385
état	Publié - 1 sept. 2011
Modification externe	Oui

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10.3982/ECTA9385

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Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

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