Social insurance with representative democracy

Stéphane Rossignol; Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.012

Social insurance with representative democracy

Stéphane Rossignol
, Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)
Université Versailles-Saint Quentin

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article › Revue par des pairs

Résumé

In a representative democracy model we determine the preferred social insurance system. We show that it corresponds to that which implies the lowest contribution rate when the risk aversion is high.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	127-134
Nombre de pages	8
journal	Economics Letters
Volume	82
Numéro de publication	1
Les DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.012
état	Publié - 1 janv. 2004
Modification externe	Oui

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10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.012

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title = "Social insurance with representative democracy",

abstract = "In a representative democracy model we determine the preferred social insurance system. We show that it corresponds to that which implies the lowest contribution rate when the risk aversion is high.",

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.012

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VL - 82

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JO - Economics Letters

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Social insurance with representative democracy

Résumé

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