TY - GEN
T1 - SPHF-friendly non-interactive commitments
AU - Abdalla, Michel
AU - Benhamouda, Fabrice
AU - Blazy, Olivier
AU - Chevalier, Céline
AU - Pointcheval, David
PY - 2013/12/1
Y1 - 2013/12/1
N2 - In 2009, Abdalla et al. proposed a reasonably practical password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) secure against adaptive adversaries in the universal composability (UC) framework. It exploited the Canetti-Fischlin methodology for commitments and the Cramer-Shoup smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs), following the Gennaro-Lindell approach for PAKE. In this paper, we revisit the notion of non-interactive commitments, with a new formalism that implies UC security. In addition, we provide a quite efficient instantiation. We then extend our formalism to SPHF-friendly commitments. We thereafter show that it allows a blackbox application to one-round PAKE and oblivious transfer (OT), still secure in the UC framework against adaptive adversaries, assuming reliable erasures and a single global common reference string, even for multiple sessions. Our instantiations are more efficient than the Abdalla et al. PAKE in Crypto 2009 and the recent OT protocol proposed by Choi et al. in PKC 2013. Furthermore, the new PAKE instantiation is the first one-round scheme achieving UC security against adaptive adversaries.
AB - In 2009, Abdalla et al. proposed a reasonably practical password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) secure against adaptive adversaries in the universal composability (UC) framework. It exploited the Canetti-Fischlin methodology for commitments and the Cramer-Shoup smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs), following the Gennaro-Lindell approach for PAKE. In this paper, we revisit the notion of non-interactive commitments, with a new formalism that implies UC security. In addition, we provide a quite efficient instantiation. We then extend our formalism to SPHF-friendly commitments. We thereafter show that it allows a blackbox application to one-round PAKE and oblivious transfer (OT), still secure in the UC framework against adaptive adversaries, assuming reliable erasures and a single global common reference string, even for multiple sessions. Our instantiations are more efficient than the Abdalla et al. PAKE in Crypto 2009 and the recent OT protocol proposed by Choi et al. in PKC 2013. Furthermore, the new PAKE instantiation is the first one-round scheme achieving UC security against adaptive adversaries.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84892376853
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-42033-7_12
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-42033-7_12
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84892376853
SN - 9783642420320
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 214
EP - 234
BT - Advances in Cryptology, ASIACRYPT 2013 - 19th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Proceedings
T2 - 19th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2013
Y2 - 1 December 2013 through 5 December 2013
ER -