Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

Olivier Gossner; Nicolas Vieille

doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3

Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

Olivier Gossner
, Nicolas Vieille

Université Paris-Nanterre
University of Louvain
Hec Paris Paris

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article de révision › Revue par des pairs

Résumé

This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	25-47
Nombre de pages	23
journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	42
Numéro de publication	1
Les DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3
état	Publié - 1 janv. 2003
Modification externe	Oui

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title = "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information",

abstract = "This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.",

keywords = "Bandit problems, Games with incomplete information, Public value of information",

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KW - Bandit problems

KW - Games with incomplete information

KW - Public value of information

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0038405035

U2 - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3

DO - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3

M3 - Review article

AN - SCOPUS:0038405035

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 42

SP - 25

EP - 47

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 1

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Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

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