TY - GEN
T1 - Template attacks with partial profiles and Dirichlet priors
T2 - 5th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2016
AU - De Chérisey, Eloi
AU - Guilley, Sylvain
AU - Rioul, Olivier
AU - Jayasinghe, Darshana
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 ACM.
PY - 2016/6/18
Y1 - 2016/6/18
N2 - In order to retrieve the secret key in a side-channel attack, the attacker computes distinguisher values using all the available data. A profiling stage is very useful to provide some a priori information about the leakage model. However, profiling is essentially empirical and may not be exhaustive. Therefore, during the attack, the attacker may come up on previously unseen data, which can be troublesome. A lazy workaround is to ignore all such novel observations altogether. In this paper, we show that this is not optimal and can be avoided. Our proposed techniques eventually improve the performance of classical information-theoretic distinguishers in terms of success rate.
AB - In order to retrieve the secret key in a side-channel attack, the attacker computes distinguisher values using all the available data. A profiling stage is very useful to provide some a priori information about the leakage model. However, profiling is essentially empirical and may not be exhaustive. Therefore, during the attack, the attacker may come up on previously unseen data, which can be troublesome. A lazy workaround is to ignore all such novel observations altogether. In this paper, we show that this is not optimal and can be avoided. Our proposed techniques eventually improve the performance of classical information-theoretic distinguishers in terms of success rate.
U2 - 10.1145/2948618.2948625
DO - 10.1145/2948618.2948625
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84983429896
T3 - ACM International Conference Proceeding Series
BT - Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2016
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 18 June 2016
ER -