Résumé
In this paper, we investigate the impact of leadership in a tax competition game. We show that leadership by a group of countries is pareto improving for each country (leaders and followers) compared to a Nash equilibrium outcome, In addition, a coalition of leaders is also pareto improving and this coalition is stable.
| langue originale | Anglais |
|---|---|
| Pages (de - à) | 51-62 |
| Nombre de pages | 12 |
| journal | Economics Bulletin |
| Volume | 34 |
| Numéro de publication | 1 |
| état | Publié - 21 févr. 2014 |
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